




and Herzegovina 2003-05 
Issues of Mandates and Management 
in ESDP Missions 
 
 
CEPS Working Document No. 255/December 2006 
 
 





The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) represents a 
watershed development for the EU and its emerging European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). Never before has the EU organised and managed this type of stabilisation 
programme. In some ways, the launching of EUPM defined a new stage in the evolution 
of the EU itself, and certainly of the ESDP. An examination of the implementation of the 
EUPM in 2003-06 and the current planning for an EU mission in Kosovo suggests that a 
process of institutional change and learning has occurred among EU and national 
officials. At the same time, it is apparent that significant improvements are still 
necessary in the coordination between and within EU pillars as they relate to ESDP 
operations. To that end, this study focuses on five important challenges revealed by EU 
field operations in BiH: mission mandates; personnel expertise, recruitment and 
training; program design, implementation and assessment; reporting and decision-
making procedures and structures; and the functions of EU representatives in the field 
(EU Special Representatives, Commission Head of Missions and Member States). Lastly, 
it also suggests the means to materially improve EU crisis response, paying special 
attention to lessons learned during the first EUPM and from EU efforts to address 
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POLICING BOSNIA  
AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 
ISSUES OF MANDATES AND MANAGEMENT  




The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is an extension of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union and, as such, it permits the EU to undertake 
missions with explicit security and defence objectives as part of a multifaceted EU strategy of 
conflict prevention, security enhancement and post-conflict reconstruction.
1 ESDP missions can 
provide the EU with rapid and collective responses to global or regional security threats, 
complementing and supporting the range of ‘soft power’ tools already in the EU toolbox, and 
enabling the EU to better meet the goals it set for itself in the 2003 European Security Strategy.
2  
Since ESDP became operational in 2003, the EU has completed four operations and there are 
currently eleven ESDP missions ongoing.
3 In addition, on 10 April 2006, the Council (2006b) 
established an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) for Kosovo, in anticipation of a future EU 
civilian operation in Kosovo. While many of the ESDP operations have been small and focused, 
the range and scope of missions is noteworthy, especially considering that the EU structures for 
ESDP did not even exist until 2002.  
With missions in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, ESDP is no longer limited to the Balkans, its 
immediate neighborhood. The EU has solidified its position as a global provider of security. In 
the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the complete range of EU instruments – Pillar 1 and 
Pillar 2, civilian and military – are deployed and thus make the lessons identified there of great 
relevance to future operational planning in the area of full-spectrum EU crisis response.
4 BiH, 
admittedly, is unique given the special status of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
and the extent to which the international community is present in the country. ESDP operations 
in BiH function in a relatively safe and benign post-conflict environment, which may not be the 
case for ESDP operations that are deployed in the middle of a genuine crisis scenario. And both 
ESDP operations in BiH are successor missions: EUPM took over from the United Nations 
police mission (IPTF) while EUFOR replaced NATO’s military mission (SFOR).  
                                                 
* Westmont College in Santa Barbara California and Visiting Research Fellow, CEPS. 
1 Notable studies of CFSP/ESDP include publications by Bono (2004); Carlsnaes et al. (2004); Ginsberg 
(2001); Jorgensen (2004); Keane (2005); Koenig-Archibugi (2004); Marsh & Mackenstein (2005); 
Menon (2004); Nutall (2000); Smith (2003); Smith (2004); Treacher (2004) and White (2004).    
2 See Council (2005e; 2006d) for recent European Council Presidency Reports on ESDP.  
3 The website of the European Union, (www.europa.eu.int) provides a detailed list of ESDP operations.  
4 The EU endorsed a ‘Comprehensive Policy’ for BiH as part of its implementation of The European 
Security Strategy (see Council, 2004a).  2 | SUSAN E. PENKSA 
 
This analysis focuses on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and its relationship to the 
other EU instruments in BiH (EUFOR, OHR/EUSR and the European Commission).
 5 This is 
important for several reasons. First, EUPM was the first ESDP operation. Its initial mandate was 
extended and revised for an additional two-year period, so EUPM has already completed a 
three-year mission. An analysis of the experience of EUPM allows an assessment about the 
degree to which the EU is becoming a more effective, coherent security actor, especially in 
post-conflict situations where more than one international actor operates and where there is 
more than one EU mission deployed in the field. The issue is not whether the EU is becoming a 
global security actor. It is already a foreign, security and defence actor, albeit one with certain 
capability limitations.
6 
Second, while there are analyses that chronicle the evolution of ESDP and EU crisis response, 
there are few case studies of ESDP field operations and even fewer analyses which connect 
operational developments in the field with the centres of decision-making power in Brussels and 
the national capitals (Hansen 2004; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Osland, 
2004). The implementation procedures of ESDP are under-studied.
7 
Third, given that policing is one of the priority areas of the Civilian Headline Goal, and that 
civilian ESDP missions have been increasing, EUPM-type missions are likely to continue.
8 
Currently, there are three EU police missions: in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL 
Kinshasa), in the Palestinian territories (EUPOL COPPS) and in BiH (EUPM-II). In Kosovo, 
the EU will probably deploy its largest police mission with around 800 to 1000 police officers, 
double the size of EUPM-I, in an integrated mission with rule of law activities.  
As the number, type and complexity of these EU operations increase, scholars, practitioners and 
national politicians will need to develop more systematic evaluations of ESDP. What is the 
impact of ESDP on conflict situations? Are the programmes that are being designed and 
implemented, effective and sustainable? Are requisite national and EU personnel and 
capabilities available to support complex, integrated, and multi-pillar missions throughout the 
world? What should be the division of responsibilities and methods of cooperation among EU 
pillars as well as between the EU and other international stakeholders? The credibility and 
effectiveness of future EU operations will depend on timely responses to these salient questions.  
The analysis presented here uses five years of primary research derived from annual meetings 
with national, EU, international agency and member state officials in Brussels, Sarajevo, 
London, Paris and Berlin, and official documents from the European Union. In Brussels, yearly 
interviews have been conducted with officials from the European Commission; from the 
                                                 
5 The primary draft of this Working Paper was completed in August 2006. An earlier version of this study 
was presented at the 47
th Annual International Studies Association Convention, San Diego, CA, 22-25 
March 2006, and at the Austrian Presidency of the EU International Workshop on “The Role of the EU in 
Civilian Crisis Management”, Vienna, Austria, 12-13 January 2006. The author is grateful to Cornelius 
Friesendorf, Roy Ginsberg, Warren Mason,  colleagues from EUPM and the European Commission, and 
three reviewers at CEPS, all of whom provided helpful comments on earlier iterations of the paper. 
6 Plans such as the Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Civilian Crisis Response Teams (CRTs) and the 2010 
Headline Goal and Rapid Reaction Force address these capability restrictions. For information about the 
Civilian Headline Goal, see Council (2004c); Council (2005c) and European Council (2004a). To learn 
more about the CRT proposal, refer to Council (2005a). For reference to the parallel capability 
requirements in the military sector of EU crisis response, see European Council (2004b).   
7 The contributors to Nowak (2006) present an excellent examination of civilian crisis management 
operations such as EUJUST Themis and EUPOL Proxima; however, EUPM is not one of the case studies.  
8 See Karlas (2005) for a recent analysis that accounts for the inclusion of conflict prevention ideas in the 
domain of ESDP.  POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 3 
 
Council structures which support ESDP: DG E (the Council Directorate for External and 
Politico-Military Affairs), the Police Unit, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the Civil-Military 
Cell; with national officials of the Council working groups chaired by the EU Presidency: the 
Committee for Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM); the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) and the Political-Military Group (PMG); EU member state representatives; NATO 
officials and US government representatives.
9 In Sarajevo, consultations have been held 
annually with high-ranking national embassy officials from both the EU and the US; with 
officials from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR); with IPTF and EUPM; with SFOR and EUFOR; with the delegation of 
the European Commission and with cabinet level officials from the government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
An examination of the implementation of ESDP in BiH, and the current planning for an EU 
mission in Kosovo, suggests that a process of institutional change and learning has been and is 
underway among EU and national officials. At the same time, it is apparent that significant 
improvements are still necessary in the coordination between and within EU pillars as they 
relate to ESDP operations.  
2.   Five Challenges 
2.1  Mandate and Vision  
EUPM (or EUPM-I, as it came to be called when its successor EUPM-II was shaped) officially 
commenced its work on January 1, 2003 as the first mission for ESDP and was established by a 
decision of the Council of the EU on March 11, 2002 (Council 2002a; Council 2002b; Council 
2002c; and Council 2002d). EUPM was endorsed by both the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) Steering Board and the UN Security Council (USCR 1396). Established for three years 
with an annual budget of 38 million Euros, EUPM-I received 20 million Euros a year from the 
European Community budget and the rest from a “costs lie where they fall” method of member 
state contributions (Council 2002a).
 10  
EUPM-I was a successor mission to the UN’s International Police Force (IPTF) which had been 
deployed in BiH for seven years. IPTF carried out reforms such as separating the police from 
the intelligence service, certifying BiH police officers through a vetting procedure that was 
designed to create a BiH police force comprised of personnel meeting internationally recognized 
standards of personal integrity and professional performance, and accrediting Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEA) that met basic democratic policing standards. IPTF began the process of 
building a democratic and sustainable BiH police force. EUPM built on the work of the UN by 
focusing its mandate on middle and senior level management development and the enhancement 
of BiH state level security institutions, which were not yet fully functional or independent.  
In accordance with the general principles outlined in the Paris/Dayton Accord, the agreement 
between the EU and BiH called on EUPM to “establish sustainable policing arrangements under 
BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising 
current BiH police standards” through “monitoring, mentoring and inspecting” local police at 
the level of mid-to-senior management. EUPM-I identified four primary mission objectives 
which included:  
                                                 
9 See Penksa (2003) for a study of the structures which support ESDP.  
10 Scannell (2004) offers an important assessment of the mechanisms for financing ESDP military 
operations while Oel (2005) provides a study of financing ESDP civilian crisis management. See Council 
(2006e), Financing of ESDP Operations, for a contemporary overview of ESDP financing procedures. 4 | SUSAN E. PENKSA 
 
o  the development of police independence and accountability;  
o  the fight against organized crime and corruption;  
o  the financial viability and sustainability of the Local Police (LP); and  
o  institution and capacity building.  
These four objectives were pursued through seven main program areas:  
o  crime police;  
o  criminal justice;  
o  internal affairs;  
o  police administration;  
o  public order and security;  
o  State Border Service (SBS); and  
o  State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA).  
The tasks were daunting for EUPM-I, given the complexity of the political arrangements created 
for BiH. A tri-partite Presidency had been created with eight State level ministries while two 
entities of BiH were also established, the Federation (with Cantons) and the Republika Srpska 
(RS), both of which maintained their own administrative and legal systems. EUPM-I employed 
approximately 500 police officers from more than thirty countries as well as civilian staff 
through a process of co-location at the State level (at the BiH Ministry of Security, INTERPOL, 
SIPA, and SBS), the Entities level (Ministry of Interior, Entity Police Academy, Cantonal 
Police (Federation), Public Security Centres/Stations (RS) and the Brcko District Police. The 
thirty-three co-locations of EUPM-I monitored more than 400 projects and nearly 10,000 
monthly reports were submitted.
11  
What did EUPM achieve during its first term? Among its contributions to police reform in BiH 
is that it furthered the institutionalization of the BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency 
(SIPA) as a police agency able to fight organized crime; it enhanced the development of other 
state-level agencies such as the State Border Service (SBS) and Ministry of Security (MoS); and 
it established the Police Restructuring Directorate, which it co-chairs with local authorities. It 
also has engaged in community building activities such as Returnee Forums which has brought 
together returnees with local police and political authorities to discuss and negotiate common 
security concerns affecting returning people.  
Many of the challenges for EUPM-I are unlikely to be as acute for other missions. EUPM-I was 
the first mission for ESDP. The Police Unit and DGIX were under-staffed and lacked prior 
experience in designing and overseeing a EUPM type of mission.
12 The first Head of Mission 
for EUPM was Sven Fredriksen, who was double-hatted as the last commissioner for the UN 
police mission (IPTF) in BiH. Commissioner Fredriksen expressed considerable frustration that 
EUPM became operational with significant procurement and program development delays that 
                                                 
11 Personal interview, Sarajevo, Official, Joint Programmes Development and Coordination Department, 
May 2006. 
12 DG IX of DG E of the Council Secretariat provides planning and support for EU civilian crisis 
management operations. The Police Unit, which is currently comprised of nine police officers and two 
political advisers, conducts planning and preparation for ESDP police missions and advises the Council’s 
working bodies, such as CIVCOM, the Committee for Civillian Crisis Management.  POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 5 
 
decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of the mission in its first year.
13 An important 
condition to Commissioner Fredriksen’s consent to lead EUPM was that he be “free from 
micromanagement from Brussels”,
14 a concern that demonstrates the complexity of ESDP style 
operations where there are multiple actors shaping and directing policy and where the decision-
making arrangements between Brussels, field HQ and co-locations require further clarification, 
such as the specific kinds of support to be provided by the Police Unit and DG IX in Brussels to 
mission HQ in Sarajevo.  
Micromanagement from Brussels was not a problem for EUPM-I; the structures in Brussels 
were just beginning to operate and if anything, needed to supply more direction to the 
implementation of EUPM’s mission objectives, rather than less. EUPM was not just the first 
ESDP operation, but the first civilian  operation to be planned by DG E of the Council 
Secretariat. There was a steep learning curve for the officials who staffed DG IX and the Police 
Unit, especially in terms of the division of responsibilities among DG IX, the Police Unit and 
EUPM’s officials in the field.  
Furthermore, given the complexities of the handover process from IPTF to EUPM-I (e.g. EUPM 
did not receive all of the documentation it needed from IPTF), the procurement and personnel 
delays, and the urgent need to design and implement new programs in an intricate and sensitive 
post-conflict environment, EUPM-I simply was not in an advantageous position to develop a 
timely and well-articulated vision for a complex strengthening mission. EUPM-I inherited many 
of its first police officers from IPTF, some of whom did not appreciate the difference in 
mandates between IPTF and EUPM-I. The inadequate specification of guidelines for program 
implementation during the first rotation of EUPM field officials further exacerbated the 
problem.  
From the beginning, EUPM-I faced an ongoing debate about the gray zone between executive 
mandate and advisory capacity.
15 In fact, the EU needed to persuade the United States to accept 
an EU police mission in BiH; the US originally wanted the OSCE – with some armed elements 
– to follow the IPTF mission.
16 Although the US eventually was persuaded to accept EUPM-I, it 
wanted EUPM to have an executive mandate, as did some of the EU member states. The 
Mission Statement for EUPM, however, explicitly states that “the mission will not include 
executive powers or the deployment of an armed component” (Council 2002b: 5). While IPTF 
was unarmed, it had an executive mandate. EUPM did not have the mandate to decertify non-
compliant police officers, nor the authorization to initiate criminal investigations against local 
police.  
The focal controversy about EUPM-I’s mandate concerned the political/strategic level where 
EUPM was tasked with “monitoring, mentoring, and inspecting, police managerial and 
operational capacities . . . to strengthen professionalism at high level within the ministries as 
well as at senior police officers levels through advisory and inspection functions. . . and to 
monitor the exercise of appropriate political control over the police” (Council 2002b: 5). From 
the perspective of EUPM-I, its primary mandate at the operational level was to “monitor, 
mentor and inspect” fourteen different objectives that the BiH police services were supposed to 
meet, a programmatic approach intended to increase local ownership and capacity.  
EUPM-I officials explain that the planning team for EUPM designed the mission using a UN 
style peacekeeping approach based on an executive mandate, rather than a strengthening 
                                                 
13 Personal interview, Sarajevo, Head of Mission EUPM, October 2002; July 2003 and October 2003. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Personal interview, Brussels, EU Member State Official, June 2005. 
16 Personal interview, Sarajevo, United States Department of State Official, July 2005. 6 | SUSAN E. PENKSA 
 
mission devoted to monitoring, mentoring, and inspecting, and that neither the Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) nor the Operation Plan (OPLAN) for EUPM-I adequately defined what 
it meant for EUPM to “mentor, monitor and inspect”.
17 When interviewed in 2003 and 2004, 
EUPM-I officials in HQ Sarajevo often commented that they required more support from DG 
IX. Neither the HOM nor DG IX wanted to micromanage EUPM-I and yet the officers staffing 
the mission were unclear about how best to implement the mandate of EUPM-I.
18 
During EUPM-I, a significant number of EU member state officials and international 
community representatives continued to criticize EUPM for not interpreting its mandate 
robustly enough in terms of its monitoring, advising and inspection functions, for not being 
more proactive in coordinating local authorities nor for leading the way on BiH police reform or 
in the fight against organized crime.
19 As one EUFOR official succinctly stated, “the conflicts 
have been about mandates, interpretations and personalities”.
20  
In the context of 2002, there was an incentive for the UN to declare IPTF a success and pressure 
to make EUPM distinct from IPTF, especially given that EUPM was the first ESDP mission. 
And, because EUPM’s first Head of Mission was the former IPTF Commissioner, it made it 
difficult for EUPM clearly to demarcate itself from IPTF and caused BiH officials to associate 
the IPTF decertification process with EUPM.
21 While problems of mandate impeded EUPM-I, a 
related obstacle stemmed from the absence of a remit to involve the criminal justice system as a 
whole and specifically, the lack of authorization to monitor prosecutors. 
In retrospect, many of the planning mistakes and delays experienced in EUPM-I were simply 
part of the EU learning curve in designing, planning and running a large police mission without 
prior or adequate EU-level or HQ Sarajevo experience. In contrast to EUFOR, which had time 
for considerable advance planning and the resources of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), EUPM-I 
was at a disadvantage in 2002-2003. The civilian structures in the Council Secretariat were 
underdeveloped by comparison with the military side of the house in 2003, and continue to be 
so, even in 2006.  
2.2 Personnel  Recruitment, Expertise and Training 
How should a mission like EUPM be properly staffed?. Quite understandably, many police 
officers lack experience in program development/evaluation, survey research and the regional 
politics of the Balkans. They need appropriate expertise if they are to do their job effectively in 
a foreign setting with a multinational team. Missions like EUPM “need civilians who know how 
to design and run projects and police who know the details”.
22 Former EUPM-I Commissioner 
Carty explains that there was an over-reliance on police for program development (an expertise 
not always in the remit of experience for even senior police officers). Rather, Carty believes, 
there needs to be close cooperation between civilian experts and specially trained police 
officers, as well as between police officers and regional experts.
23  
Both civilian and police personnel at HQ Sarajevo reported that EUPM was lacking sufficient 
specialized expertise in organized crime, financial crime, and human trafficking. Well into 
                                                 
17 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, EUPM Officials, 2003-2005. 
18 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, EUPM Officials, 2002-2004 
19 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, OHR, EUFOR and EU Member State Officials, 2003-2006.  
20 Personal interview, Sarajevo, EUFOR Official, July 2005.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Personal interview, Sarajevo, EUPM Official, July 2005.  
23 Personal interview, Sarajevo, EUPM Head of Mission, July 2005. POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 7 
 
2004, EUPM HQ Sarajevo was still reporting to DG IX its critical need for an improved fit 
between the qualifications of national secondments and EUPM job descriptions and for 
improved pre-mission training by the sending states. Indeed, some states sent officers with no 
pre-mission training at all.
24 In order to increase ownership of ESDP program objectives among 
multi-national personnel, contributing member states need to provide standardized pre-mission 
training and ESDP field operations must refine their induction training as well. Lastly, member 
states must ensure that personnel meet the appropriate language requirements (English is the 
official language) in order to effectively fulfill their responsibilities.  
Clearly, the EU needs to do better in appropriate mission staffing than has the UN, which has 
struggled considerably to find appropriate national secondments. With higher-level police 
missions that have sophisticated mandates for the mentoring, advising and training of target 
police forces, having the right kind of personnel in the field is especially critical. The EU 
requires experts with both specialized expertise and field experience, but “some of the most 
scarce personnel resources in civilian police operations, such as forensics experts or narcotics 
police, are not surprisingly the most expensive and the most prized domestic resources” (Hansen 
2004:179).  
As the number of ESDP civilian missions has increased, it has become obvious that the civilian 
personnel in DG IX are overstretched. The Political Adviser for EUPM-II in DG IX has 
responsibility for three ESDP operations. Currently, the Secretariat is dependent on the mission 
in the field to generate lessons identified.
25 If the number of operations expands without an 
increase in personnel, the Council Secretariat will find it increasingly difficult to provide 
adequate mission oversight and strategic planning capacity. It would seem that the first and 
somewhat obvious steps toward a solution are to augment the capacities and personnel of DG 
IX, especially in light of the upcoming ESDP operation in Kosovo, and over the medium and 
long-term, to reorganize the Council Secretariat bodies responsible for ESDP (an issue 
addressed in the conclusion of this paper).  
A second need that emerges from the experience of recent operations is for the EU to hire 
independent analysts to assist with program development and assessment (in Brussels and in 
field operations). There are too few personnel devoted to this important task, both within the 
Brussels structures and within field operations, let alone enough officials who have the time to 
prepare comparative “lessons identified” studies. Currently, there is not financial support to 
recruit civilian contracts and missions must “make do” with national secondments.
26 Having 
independent civilian contractors to augment the work of those EU officials charged with 
documenting “lessons identified/best practices” would provide greater objectivity in analysis, 
increase transparency and allow officials to analyze best and worst practices not only within 
missions, but also  across missions. If the EU is to develop more comprehensive planning 
capacities, its effectiveness, in part, will be dependent on the institutional knowledge and 
memory of best and worst practices from mission to mission. Experts with field experience from 
completed ESDP operations need to be in contact with those officials designing and working in 
future ESDP missions, at the level of Brussels and in the field, as is now the case for EUPT-
Kosovo.  
The creation of Civilian Response Teams (CRT’s) as a means to redress shortfalls in national 
secondments for civilian crisis management operations should provide a partial solution to the 
                                                 
24 Compared with IPTF, however, there is general agreement among EU and member state officials that 
over time, EUPM has generated a higher quality of personnel for its mission. 
25 Personal interviews, Brussels, DG E, Council Secretariat, June 2006.  
26 Personal interview, Sarajevo, EUPM Official, July 2005. 8 | SUSAN E. PENKSA 
 
personnel problem (Council 2005a).
27 The initial cadre of CRT experts will consist of up to one 
hundred pre-selected and trained national experts who can be rapidly deployed to offer early 
assessment of a crisis, to assist the establishment of a civilian ESDP mission, and/or to 
temporarily support the EU Special Representative or an ongoing civilian crisis management 
operation. If the number of ESDP civilian operations continues to increase rapidly, then the EU 
will certainly need to move beyond the initial cadre of one hundred experts. While the CRT 
concept will improve the EU’s ability to rapidly deploy personnel, it does not provide for the 
use of civilian contracts outside national secondment practices, nor does it address the more 
generalized problem of personnel expertise.  
A third initiative to improve the quality of missions and the decision-making procedures that 
support them would be to have a separate budget line for policy oriented research, especially in 
the area of civilian crisis management. For example, the EU could appoint “in-house” research 
scholars to facilitate the exchange of best and worst practices not only within and across EU 
missions but with other international actors, such as among the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN in 
realms such as security sector reform,
28 the rule of law and integrated crisis response.
29 Many of 
the suggestions called for in the 2000 Brahimi Report (United Nations 2000), by the OSCE 
(2005), and the Challenges Project (2005) are also applicable to the EU. Understandably, the 
Council Secretariat is absorbed by time-consuming internal coordination procedures, and so its 
officials are rather isolated from other colleagues at the UN, NATO or OSCE. During a period 
of time in which the EU is extending its scope of actions in security sector reform
30 and the rule 
of law, officials have an interest in distinguishing the EU from other organizations involved in 
similar activities, especially those that are sometimes seen as competitors. An official from 
EUPM-I suggested that EUPM could have benefited from the experiences of the OSCE office in 
Belgrade but that there was political resistance to doing so.
31 While other international 
organizations have valuable field and operational experience that could be utilized by EU 
officials, the EU is attempting a level of integrated crisis response through its many instruments 
that surpasses anything currently possible in NATO, OSCE or UN.  
A more systematic research effort by the EU is related to a fourth step to enhance the on-the-
ground effectiveness of ESDP missions: an increase in the quality of induction training for 
personnel serving the mission. It is especially important that mission officials in the field learn 
how to represent the aims, policies and procedures of the European Union, and not just the 
approaches and standards of their home country or their technical field of expertise.
32 Many EU 
officials believe that “best European and international standards” are derived organically from 
bringing together well-trained police officers. This is certainly true, at least in part. 
Nevertheless, throughout the duration of EUPM-I, police officers expressed frustration and a 
lack of clarity about what they were to achieve in meeting the mission objectives, an uncertainty 
that hindered mission success. There is a widely held perception among field operatives that one 
                                                 
27 The “Brahimi Report” of the United Nations (2000) suggests the same idea, but in the context of UN 
peace operations.   
28 The international challenges of security sector reform are studied by Ball (2004); Bellamy (2003); 
Celador (2005) and Wilson (2005).  
29 The EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris serves this purpose, in part. But, the EU also would 
benefit from having dedicated in-house research fellows located in its Brussels offices.  
30 See Council (2005b) and European Commission (2006) for the current articulation of concepts and 
strategies to guide EU security sector reform. It is noteworthy that both the Council and European 
Commission produced their own papers and that there is still a long way to go in achieving a 
comprehensive and  joint EU approach to SSR. 
31 Personal interview, Sarajevo,  Quality Control Department, EUPM Official, July 2005. 
32 Ibid. POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 9 
 
year rotations are still not long enough because it “takes time to get on the ground, to develop a 
clear understanding of projects and how to carry them out and to become trusted among local 
counterparts”.
33 EUPM-I “upgraded its own mission training so that new officers learned the 
basics of project management and how to be culturally and politically sensitive to their local 
counterparts” but EUPM officials still express the belief that EU member states need to do a 
better job of training their national secondments to participate in EU missions.
34 
The critical need for mission training holds true even for the highest levels of ESDP officials, 
including Heads of Mission (HOM), whose EU expertise and understanding of ESDP can vary 
widely. Heads of Mission for ESDP operations must, and do, possess technical competence but 
their role in a complex mission environment such as BiH, Kosovo or Congo requires political 
acumen about the EU and the domestic political environment. While Heads of Mission are 
provided with Political and Legal Advisers both in the mission and in the Council Secretariat, 
their own public leadership roles require political savvy about the EU, the domestic context, and 
the challenges of coordination among multiple EU and international stakeholders.  
These four priority areas, then, can be summed up as the need to find qualified personnel who 
are able to design, implement and evaluate programs through the entire duration of a mission. 
This is dependent on a shift of priorities in the member states. As things stand now, it is hard for 
them to encourage their best police officers, lawyers, auditors, prosecutors or experts in 
organized crime to go to BiH, Palestine or Congo. The Council Secretariat cannot recruit its 
own mission personnel and must rely on member state databases and recruitment procedures, 
which vary widely in quality. It is very difficult to find senior experts willing to interrupt their 
professional trajectory to participate in EU missions that, as of yet, do not result in career 
advancement at home.
35 If the Union is to be genuinely capable in this area, the available cadre 
of qualified specialists must be expanded, and rapidly so if it is going to undertake a large-scale 
mission in Kosovo.  
2.3  Program Design, Implementation and Assessment 
The issues of program design, implementation and assessment  will continue to pose a 
significant challenge for future ESDP operations. This is a subject that goes beyond a concern 
with “benchmarking”. Depending on whom one asks, the lessons about EUPM-I are not all 
perceived in the same way. Some officials believe that the programs developed were too 
sophisticated for implementation by both EUPM-I and BiH officials. Others suggest that the 
programs and benchmarking systems were innovative and appropriate, but that officials lacked 
adequate time for proper implementation and that there were simply too many programs 
attempted. Still others interpret the issue to be one about expertise, that the mission needed a 
different combination of professional skills.  
The type of strengthening mission envisaged for EUPM-I indeed was complicated Its mandate 
required both “inspections” and “mentoring” of the mid-to-senior management level. The 
officials tasked with program design continued – throughout the duration of the mission – to 
express questions about the best methods for program implementation and assessment. These 
questions tend to confirm the need for additional training and greater oversight, and perhaps 
even different kinds of expertise. But, most importantly, the apparent lesson is not “that a 
programmatic approach failed” for EUPM-I, as some EU and member state officials have 
suggested, but that the implementation and assessment criteria for ESDP operations need further 
development in the light of field experience. 
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Complex missions like EUPM must not only have the right expertise, but a well-developed 
approach to program design and standardized assessment procedures. In the case of ESDP, DG 
IX provides guidance and support to its missions for achieving broad program objectives for 
implementation. The programs for ESDP operations are designed by mission HQ, and not by 
DG IX. But unless the personnel in the field who have the responsibility for designing and 
implementing program have the right professional expertise, the mission will struggle to reach 
its program objectives.  
In the case of EUPM-I, officers were sent out into the field offices without implementation 
guidelines or assessment protocols. EUPM Officials in the thirty-three co-locations identified 
different program needs and there were inconsistencies of interpretation and implementation 
throughout the entire program cycle. A EUPM-I police official reported the problem in the 
following way: “we had hundreds of police officers in the field reading project descriptions, left 
alone to decide their own implementation methods”.
36 Because some of the officers in EUPM’s 
first rotation cycle came from IPTF, many of them were more familiar with an operational 
approach, rather than a longer-term programmatic emphasis.  
The delays in program design and implementation procedures for EUPM-I effectively meant 
that EUPM-I did not start many of its core projects until late 2004, well into the second year of a 
three-year mission. The EUPM benchmarking system was developed after the EUPM Senior 
Management Conference held in Neum, June 6-9, 2004. That conference produced a significant 
restructuring of EUPM, such as rationalizing and simplifying the reporting process; establishing 
a new office of “Quality Control”; and creating a new EU/International Community (IC) 
Coordination Cell to improve the links among international actors in the field. By autumn of 
2004, assessment indicators were set out for particular project objectives to help EUPM officials 
and their local counterparts to judge the approximate stage of implementation that had been 
reached but as a member of the Program Development team remarked, “these indicators should 
have been there from the beginning”.
37 And, even after assessment procedures were 
significantly clarified, field personnel still reported a lack of common understanding about how 
exactly to interpret whether, for example, fifty percent of a program goal had been implemented 
so that there were “observable changes” in some of the implementation activities and strategies. 
It was not necessarily the case that officers even interpreted the program goals in the same 
way.
38  
The decision to develop a benchmarking system was indeed appropriate. Field officials needed 
to be provided with standardized methods for making assessments. However, the process that 
was put in place was judged by both EUPM-I and BiH officials to be overly complicated and 
difficult to use. Moreover, in EUPM-I, probably fewer programs should have been attempted in 
the interest of getting right those that had highest priority. This was especially so since EUPM 
was the first ESDP operation of its kind, there were already known procurement delays (because 
of obstacles presented by Community financing mechanisms) and because program 
development and assessment standards were inadequately specified. Four hundred projects were 
too many, especially for a large mission with a multinational staff unclear about precisely how 
to implement programs developed in HQ Sarajevo, and how to do so in close cooperation with 
BiH counterparts.
39  
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A final factor affecting mission success is the interdependence of program design and 
assessment, on the one hand, and local ownership of program objectives and mandate decisions 
on the other. Field co-location for EUPM-I was an excellent choice, but until EUPM-II there 
were no BiH officials located in the department for program design and implementation. 
Moreover, EUPM-I required a strong advisory and inspection function to ensure that local 
officials were sufficiently implementing EUPM programs, the component of EUPM-I’s 
mandate that was the most debated. Some senior BiH police officials were often reluctant to 
follow-through with programs that were politically sensitive due to intervention by BiH 
Ministers of Interior.
40 And, as mentioned earlier, EUPM-I had no mandate to monitor 
prosecutors, the officials who are responsible for directing police investigations. This inevitably 
placed more responsibility on the intra-pillar cooperation between EUPM-I and OHR/EUSR.  
EUPM HQ in Sarajevo and the Council Secretariat need thus to reflect further on the “lessons 
identified” from EUPM-I, the transition process of turning over projects to BiH counterparts and 
the progress achieved in developing a more systematic assessment of program design, 
implementation and assessment,. The Council Secretariat, officials staffing future ESDP 
missions and the third countries who host ESDP missions, would all benefit from a systematic 
and comparative review of ESDP training requirements, program objectives, implementation 
methods and evaluation procedures.  
2.4  Reporting and Decision-Making Procedures 
A further challenge that emerged early on for EUPM-I was a lack of standard operating 
procedures at all levels, specifically with the communication protocol and reporting structures. 
For example, a few officers in the field eliminated their computer databases at the end of their 
contract term and did not handover valuable information to their successors.
41 As early as 
September 2003, EUPM internally acknowledged that for the mission to be successful, “the 
reporting and controlling mechanism needs a practical interface between the Field and Main 
HQ”, and that the existing reporting system designed in 2003 was not effective. Guidelines were 
sent out at all EUPM levels in October, 2004, but this was almost at the end of the second year 
of a three year mission. Another lesson learned appears to be that, in a police mission the size of 
EUPM, standard operating procedures require early development and consistent application.  
Establishing proper reporting and information transfer procedures within each field office are 
technical procedures that are rather easy to learn and to implement. A more complicated issue is 
the reporting relationship between HQ Sarajevo and Brussels. From interviews with EU, 
national and field representatives, there are two interrelated problems that emerge: 1.) the lack 
of clarity about the type of support to be provided by DG IX and the Police Unit to ESDP field 
operations; and 2) the need for transparent and ongoing discussions about lessons learned in the 
field. 
EUPM-I officials would have preferred to have received more guidance from the Police Unit of 
the Council Secretariat about how to improve their reporting mechanisms. However, the role of 
the Secretariat is not clearly defined, nor its place in the command and control relationship of 
operations. Does the Secretariat represent High Representative Solana, or the presidency and the 
member states, or the interests of particular units, such as DG IX? The answer can be all of the 
above, depending upon the issue. The paradox is that on average, member states believe that the 
Council Secretariat is becoming stronger and too independent of member states. Yet, because of 
the intergovernmental process of decision-making in Pillar Two and the strong ownership 
required by the member states for ESDP operations, the Council Secretariat has to consult with 
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PSC and CIVCOM (the member states) at frequent intervals (e.g. as it prepares the Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) for missions). Although the PSC and 
CIVCOM possess an important function of strategic oversight by exercising political control 
over missions, neither group issues specific instructions for the implementation of operational 
mandates. This means that the primary responsibility for mission implementation is on DG-E of 
the Council Secretariat and the ESDP officials who are located in the field.  
The reporting process for ESDP operations involves a significant exchange of information given 
that both field personnel and Council Secretariat officials provide frequent briefings to 
CIVCOM and PSC, briefings which are periodically supplemented by PSC, CIVCOM, Council 
Secretariat and individual member state visits to the field. As the complexity of the EU 
governance regime increases in matters of CFSP/ESDP and between Pillars I and II, EU 
member states (the decision-makers in Pillar II) must have confidence that the assessments 
received from the field are honest. Some political filtering is, of course, to be expected and field 
personnel will not always have perceptions that match those of national capitals or Brussels-
based officials. Member states, moreover, rely not only on formal reporting mechanisms but 
also on the informal reports they receive from their national secondments and embassies in the 
field.  
Strategic decisions to modify an ESDP mission involve an elaborate and cumbersome process 
of going from the field through the Brussels decision-making machinery. An analysis of the 
challenges faced by EUPM suggests that more intricate ESDP missions will necessitate a 
simplified reporting and decision-making process within Pillar Two, as well as more frequent 
interactions between Brussels and field operations. However, as the number of ESDP operations 
continues to increase, sustaining a frequent level of interaction, between EU and member state 
officials in Brussels with mission counterparts in the field, will be easier said than done. To that 
end, the Brussels decision-making structures for ESDP necessitate restructuring and expansion, 
in both size and capabilities, especially for civilian ESDP operations, and eventually, a 
comprehensive reorganization of the Council Secretariat decision-making structures. 
2.5  The EU’s Representatives in the Field 
In BiH, the EU Presidency, the member states, the Commission, OHR/EUSR, EUFOR, EUPM, 
OSCE and NATO all interact in a complex policy-making environment. In addition this has to 
function alongside the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, i.e. the international 
coalition that has played a central coordinating role in BiH since the end of the war, which is 
comprised of the EU Presidency, the European Commission, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States,  
Early in its engagement in BiH, the international community struggled with a noticeable 
absence of stakeholder coordination, which resulted in duplication of resources, competition 
among international organizations and member state interests, and often, reduced political 
leverage among the domestic actors. The situation in 2006 is markedly improved from five 
years earlier, due to a streamlining process centered around the OHR, which consolidated and 
rationalized international assistance. This was made possible because all of the stakeholders in 
BiH were united around the long-term goal of facilitating BiH membership in the EU. 
One of the central lessons identified in the BiH experience is that individuals matter, as well as 
decision-making procedures, structures and mandates. Merely bringing together individuals 
around a table does not equal coordination. For example, in 2005 there was tension between 
EUPM-I and EUFOR, which was undesirable and counterproductive. EUPM-I officials were 
told to increase their trust of local police and to transfer more authority to the locals, while 
EUFOR officers were given the message that the local police were not to be trusted. This 
resulted in field conflict between EUFOR and EUPM-I personnel and a perception by locals that POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 13 
 
the EU was not of one accord, permitting some officials within the BiH government to exploit 
the divergence among EU actors.
42  
Another dispute in 2005 centered on the EUSR proposal to bring the legal, political and media 
functions of EUPM-II under the EUSR competency.
43 The EUSR argued that these departments 
should be brought under its control in order to have a single chain of command and complete 
coherence of advice for real time coordination and visibility to the local and international 
community.. In a convergence of interests between EUPM and the European Commission, the 
Commission Delegation (Pillar I) and EUPM-I (Pillar II) disagreed with the EUSR (Pillar II) 
proposal, and, instead favored that the political, legal and media departments remain within the 
command structure of the EUPM Head of Mission to provide the Police Head of Mission with 
immediate access to the departments that it relies upon.  
Clearly, individuals shape outcomes as much as mandates and decision-making structures. The 
new HR/EUSR, Dr. Schwarz-Schilling, has not assumed control of the political, legal and media 
functions of EUPM-II, in recognition that EUPM-II needs its advisers in-house (EUPM and 
OHR/EUSR are not located in the same building).
44 The current reporting arrangement between 
EUPM-II and the EUSR was determined by the new EUSR and the Head of Mission for EUPM-
II; since it was a Pillar II decision, the Commission view was irrelevant to the extent that it had 
limited influence on the outcome. However, the 2005 debate revealed that traditional Pillar I and 
II rivalries are still alive in the period following the failed Constitutional referenda, with the 
future of the external action service far from settled. Moreover, the discussions also amplified 
the increasing complexity of political negotiations within Pillar II, as well as among all EU 
missions in the field.  
Traditional pillar distinctions do not necessarily become apparent in the field in the same way 
that they materialize in Brussels Although the European Commission expressed concern in the 
2005 discussions that a large EUSR office would be created “using the back door of EUPM”, 
European Commission officials repeatedly have affirmed the necessity of having a strong and 
influential EUSR for BiH in order to exert the political leverage essential to constitutional 
reform and police restructuring.
45 In 2004, a European Commission official in BiH commented 
that the absence of officials working exclusively for the EUSR reduced the visibility of the 
EUSR role to BiH.
46 At that time, there were no dedicated staff for the EUSR; by 2005, there 
were three officials and a separate web page.  
Simply stated, the EUSR has not been very visible to BiH. An EU member state ambassador in 
Sarajevo commented that if “we were to ask the citizens of BiH who represented the EU, it 
would be the Commission Delegation”, not the member states or the EUSR.
47With preparations 
underway for the eventual closure of OHR, however, the role of the EUSR in BiH is of 
increasing salience. At the June 23 meeting of the PIC Steering Board, the Political Directors 
agreed that “it was in the interest of all for BiH to take full responsibility for its own affairs” and 
recommended that OHR begin preparations to close its offices by June 30, 2007 (PIC 2006). By 
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then, BiH will have concluded its 2006 elections and, hopefully, its Stabilization and 
Association negotiation with the EU; and EUFOR likely will have reduced troop levels. The 
Commission and Council bodies are already discussing the precise needs for a strengthened 
EUSR capacity in BiH. Along with greater independence exercised by the BiH government, the 
EU will need a reinforced presence, with a politically active EUSR. The sensitive issues of 
constitutional reform and police restructuring will require strong political leadership by the EU 
and consensus among the international community.  
Will the international community be ready to have a strengthened EUSR facilitate greater 
coordination, not just among EU instruments, but for the international community as a whole? 
The position of the EU Special Representative is of greatest value in crises and post-conflict 
situations where there must be the strong political visibility of the EU and its member states, 
and where the political leverage of multiple actors may be called upon. Ideally, the EUSR 
should serve as a critical catalyst for cooperation and coherence among instruments and Heads 
of Mission. In a complex field situation such as BiH, there needs to be a EUSR asking for 
regular results and acting as primus inter pares, and serving as a strong representative for the 
Union as a whole.  
A logical first step would be to co-locate the EUSR office with the Commission Delegation and, 
as a second step, to double-hat the EUSR and the Commission Head of Delegation. A decision 
for double-hatting should not be pre-determined with artificial time tables, but only after a 
comprehensive review has taken place of the objectives that have been reached by the ESDP 
instruments in BiH, the precise mandate and functions to be exercised by the EUSR and the 
progress reached by the BiH government in its march towards EU accession and normalization.  
It is not just the EUSR which may have a determinative impact on field cooperation, but that 
also of the European Commission and member states. The European Commission, through the 
process of enlargement negotiations in the Balkans, has assumed a more political role in its field 
operations there. In countries where it provides traditional development assistance and trade 
relationships, the Commission functions in a more technical capacity. In a stabilization situation 
where Commission officials are engaged in sensitive political negotiations, the Commission is 
adopting a more proactive approach, including the use of political conditionality (such as the 
decision to suspend membership negotiations with Serbia pending its increased cooperation 
with the ICTY).  
With a more pro-active Commission, as well as multiple EU instruments on the ground in BiH, 
member state influence may sometimes be circumscribed. In interviews with EU member state 
Ambassadors in Sarajevo from 2003-2006, there was marked consensus that EU member states 
are comparatively less active in BiH, given the number of EU-level instruments, the role of the 
HR/EUSR, the sizeable presence of the international community and, most importantly, because 
of the influential role played by the European Commission in the stabilization and association 
process with BiH. In such a setting, the Presidency has the privilege of being more active, 
alongside the ‘EU-3’ (France, Germany, UK).  
While member states may be less influential in BiH than in other capitals, political divergences 
are still apparent among EU member states and EU instruments, and this is true even in a field 
situation such as BiH where the EU’s political, economic and military instruments are focused 
on the single overriding objective of ‘Europeanising’ BiH. Such divergences, especially when 
they become public, reduce the leverage and credibility of the EU as a whole.  
In 2005, there was a fissure among a few member states and also between the Commission and 
OHR/EUSR over the sensitive issue of the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) and the exact 
requirements for securing domestic agreement among all three BiH political groups (in terms of 
whether police services would have the right to cross the IEBL). The BiH Serbs attempted to POLICING BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 2003-05 | 15 
 
exploit perceived differences in interpretation among the Commission, OHR and member states 
in its negotiations. OHR and the Commission negotiated as a united front and attempted to keep 
the differences “in-house”.
48 But internal EU disputes often become public to BiH officials, and, 
sometimes, even to the broader public.  
This illustration highlights, once again, the absolute necessity of the EU being able to “speak 
with one voice”, especially on politically sensitive issues such as security sector reform. EU 
programs which address police restructuring or organized crime involve both technical and 
political  reforms that require a significant understanding of domestic political realities and 
necessitate ongoing cooperation and communication among EU operations, especially in the 
message sent to the local population.  
There is no easy dividing line between civilian crisis management under Pillar II and 
Community assistance programs under Pillar I, or between ESDP operations under Pillar II and 
actions taken in Pillar III under the rubric of Justice and Home Affairs. The political success of 
EU multinational, cross-pillar missions depends as much on getting the “mandates and 
structures right” as it does upon the good will and cooperation among individuals on the ground. 
Coherence and coordination in the external actions of the EU are facilitated as much by creating 
the appropriate structures of coordination as they are by bringing the right people together and 
reaching member state consensus. EU cooperation in sectors such as organized crime and rule 
of law reform will increasingly transform the pillar system of external action, and likely will 
compel new habits of cooperation, trust and innovation to develop, in Brussels as well as in the 
field among multiple stakeholders. 
3.  Improving EU Crisis Response 
3.1  From EUPM-I to EUPM-II  
Current indicators suggest that the EU has learned from the challenges of the past and that its 
officials are eager to apply the lessons of EUPM-I to the present EUPM-II. In anticipation of the 
closure of OHR by 30 June 2007 and a probable reduction in EUFOR’s force levels, the High 
Representative/Council and European Commission have initiated advance planning for 
reinforced EU engagement in BiH. A revised OPLAN for EUPM-II was completed in March 
2006 which provides detailed instructions for the operation of EUPM-II, its relationship with 
other EU instruments, and indicators for mission success.
49 For example, EUPM-EUFOR 
relations have significantly improved since 2005. In March, EUPM-II assumed the 
responsibilities of Chair of the EU-ESDP Targeting Board from EUFOR and on May 11, 
EUFOR and EUPM-II formally adopted the Common Operational Guidelines in support of the 
fight against organized crime.  
After a complex process of renegotiating the mandate for EUPM’s second term, it has a new 
three pillar focus:  
o  supporting the local police in the fight against organized crime;  
o  conducting inspections and monitoring of police operations; 
o  supporting the implementation of police restructuring.  
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EUPM-II has a reorganized structure based on a regional approach, rather than intensive co-
location. EUPM-II personnel are deployed in four regional centers in Banja Luka, Tuzla, Mostar 
and Sarajevo, which correspond to SIPA’s (the main police agency in BiH responsible for the 
fight against organized crime) regional offices. 
At the end of EUPM-I, there were projects still to be concluded, either because they were given 
to the co-locations in 2005 without enough time to implement or because of legal, political or 
financial problems of implementation. In order to conclude projects from EUPM-I, a 
Memorandum of Commitment between EUPM and BiH was signed at the Police Steering Board 
Meeting of February 17, 2006 in which the BiH Police Authorities confirmed their intent to 
implement agreed upon projects from EUPM-I. In order to facilitate a successful transition of 
giving unfinished projects to the BiH authorities, EUPM-II brought five BiH liaison officers 
into EUPM-II headquarters and appointed two EUPM project officers per region who have the 
responsibility to inspect the progress of project implementation. New projects by BiH police 
will be developed in the second half of 2006, the consolidation phase of operation for EUPM-II.  
In its first six months, EUPM-II took actions such as facilitating the re-opening of unsolved 
murder cases (believed to be linked to organized crime), initiating preparations to support a BiH 
police services public information campaign against drugs, monitoring and conducting 
inspections of BiH internal controls and investigation procedures, and continuing support of 
SIPA and SBS, such as through joint police and prosecutor training. The Rule of Law project 
management working group, which was formed to establish SIPA and includes participation by 
both EUPM and OHR/EUSR, has been expanded to address a wider scope of issues involved in 
a rule of law program for BiH, such as personnel and recruitment for SIPA and SBS, police 
reform, and Interpol. With EUPM leadership in structures such as the Criminal Justice Interface 
Unit, there is an augmented relationship between the prosecutorial sector and police and 
improved intelligence exchange with all levels of BiH police.  
Of the three pillars of operation for EUPM-II, the responsibility that is the most challenging is 
police restructuring, one of the remaining criteria that BiH must meet in order to proceed with 
Community SAA negotiations.
50 EUPM-I did not have primary responsibility for the political 
process of facilitating an agreement on police reform in BiH. Prior to 2006, the main EU actors 
were the Commission and OHR/EUSR.  
After the publication of a European Commission report in July 2004 that detailed the problems 
intrinsic to having independent police agencies in BiH, on July 5, 2004 a Police Restructuring 
Commission was established by the High Representative in order to facilitate a single structure 
of policing. The Police Restructuring Commission, in agreement with the initial review 
conducted by the European Commission, found that the BiH police system was “too 
complicated, too expensive and not sufficiently effective in combating crime”.
51  
An intensely politicized debate ensued about the principles to govern a process of police 
restructuring for BiH. In October 2005, a political agreement was reached on establishing three 
principles of the European Commission to govern police restructuring:  
o  all legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at the 
State level;  
o  there must be no political interference with operational policing; 
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o  functional local police areas must be determined by technical policing criteria, where 
operational command is exercised at the local level.  
While the agreement of the “three principles” was viewed as a success at the time, the 
international community knew that the actual implementation of the principles would continue 
to be politicized, especially in the context of the October 2006 elections in BiH.
52 The 
diplomatic achievement of reaching consensus on three principles was but a first step in a long 
diplomatic process of sensitive negotiations. While reforming the defense sector of BiH also has 
been protracted and arduous, police restructuring is even more sensitive. Police restructuring is 
inextricably connected to rule of law reform (judicial, penal and prosecutorial) and is seen as the 
last area of RS entity autonomy, in the wake of the RS already ceding maintenance of its own 
defense services.  
Presently, both Pillars One and Two of the EU have responsibilities in police restructuring, a 
reform process which requires a coordinated effort among EU actors, a clear structure of 
decision-making authority, and the full participation and consent of local actors. By way of 
illustration, both EUPM-II and the Commission work in close cooperation with the BiH 
government on police reform. The Commission provides assistance to the BiH Police 
Directorate. EUPM-II is co-located with the BiH government in SIPA and SBS. The Head of 
Mission for EUPM is a voting member of the Steering Board of the Police Restructuring 
Directorate (which was established following the October 2005 agreement and held its first 
meeting 26 January 2006), and the EUPM Police Reform Unit advises the board on technical 
and operational issues. The third actor is OHR which has a major unit focused on “Rule of Law 
Implementation”, primarily centered on organized crime and corruption. The activities of OHR 
in the fight against organized crime and corruption are further supported by the function of the 
HR/EUSR to exercise a coordination mandate vis-à-vis the actions of OHR, EUFOR and 
EUPM.  
Despite increased cooperation among the international community, especially by the EU and 
OHR/HR, police restructuring has stalled in the run-up to the October elections. At the May 24, 
2006 meeting of the Police Restructuring Directorate, the RS indicated that it would participate 
in future sessions as an observer, not as a full participant. This decision by the RS, its requests 
to include explicit entity references in a future police model for BiH (in an apparent bid to 
reinterpret the three principles) and references by RS Prime Minister Dodik about the possibility 
of holding a Montenegrin-like vote on independence, have hindered the negotiation process and 
raised concern among the international community.
53  
Strong statements have been issued by both the High Representative/EUSR and Javier Solana in 
which they have called upon the RS to constructively participate in the police restructuring 
process; otherwise, “lack of progress on police restructuring in accordance with the October 
2005 Agreement will inevitably lead to delays in concluding SAA negations”.
54 Beyond the 
“carrot” of the SAA negotiation process, the EU has had limited leverage in the pre-election 
period of politicization by domestic political actors. 
For EUPM-II, progress in police restructuring certainly will be a consideration for the EU’s 
determination about when to terminate the mission, but it is also a responsibility for which 
EUPM has limited scope of intervention given its mandate. Despite its important task to support 
police restructuring, the majority of work by EUPM-II is focused on its other pillars of 
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responsibility: supporting the BiH police in the fight against organized crime and providing 
accountability to police services through its monitoring and inspection functions.  
Certainly, a central lesson from the present challenges to secure police restructuring in BiH is 
that it is not just  a technical project.
55 It is a political-diplomatic process that requires 
comprehensive strategic agreement and political leadership among EU instruments and actors 
and the full cooperation of domestic political officials. In the post-election period, EU missions 
and officials participating in police restructuring will have to increase their political pressure on 
BiH officials to move forward with police restructuring so that the SAA can be concluded. 
Between now and the end of 2007, the EU will face significant choices about its desired role in 
BiH as it considers the end state for both EUPM and EUFOR. These decisions will be 
influenced as much by events and conditions within  BiH (e.g. the degree of post-election 
political stability, the achievements of police restructuring, the closure of OHR, the extent of 
progress in the fight against organized crime and war criminal apprehension) as by 
circumstances in the broader Balkan region.  
3.2  The Case of Organized Crime  
At the level of the EU, there has been an expansion of cooperation in the fight against organized 
crime, corruption, illegal immigration and counter-terrorism in the Balkans.
56 For BiH, and the 
entire region of the Balkans, these problems are obstacles to democratic governance and 
economic sustainability, as well as threats to the wider European neighborhood. In a setting 
where there are many stakeholders, integrated planning and execution across all Community 
and Union pillars is the only long-term solution. More regional and thematic task forces need to 
be created across the EU pillar system, as well as a greater cross-fertilization among experts. 
The Working Group on Organized Crime for BiH is a great beginning, but the process must go 
well beyond. A new web of constant contact and cooperation needs to emerge in this relative 
new field of EU activity. This will be an important part of a security and defense culture that 
must develop to support EU crisis operations. 
The case of organized crime provides a trenchant illustration of the problems of mandates, 
decision-making structures and individual leadership. For organized crime to be effectively 
addressed by the EU, the entire criminal justice system of the domestic government must be 
taken into account – legislation, police, prosecutors, judges and the penal system. Without either 
domestically effective law enforcement capabilities or sustainable police services, international 
efforts to reduce organized crime will be minimally effective. Inexorably, the fight against 
organized crime in BiH is contingent upon rule of law reform and the strengthening of local 
police capacity. This involves fully institutionalizing SIPA and SBS, sustaining new patterns of 
police independence and accountability, and ensuring that BiH has the basic resources in the 
fight against organized crime and corruption, such as telephone interception, a single data base, 
and appropriate expertise.  
According to the observations of field personnel, the lack of an integrated rule of law program 
in BiH has been a hindrance to EU effectiveness. Rule of law activities have been carried out by 
OHR, OSCE, EUPM, EUFOR, and the EC Delegation. In police reform, through 2005, there 
was no unified political strategy because OHR/EUSR, the EC Delegation and EUPM all had 
varying degrees of involvement, influence and interests. For example, in EUPM-I there was no 
monitoring function of BiH prosecutors. Although EUPM-I facilitated increased 
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professionalism and accountability among BiH police, it did not have a mandate to connect 
police reform to the performance of prosecutors and judges, nor did it have sufficient 
mechanisms of cooperation in place with OHR, the international actor primarily in charge of 
facilitating rule of law reform for BiH. Hence, many cases against criminals – some of them war 
criminals – never received action by prosecutors. 
Moreover, before the revised Council mandate for EUPM-II that became operational in 2006, 
there was no comprehensive approach among EU instruments to address the problem of 
organized crime in BiH. EUSR/OHR, EUPM and EUFOR all engaged in activities to address 
the problem, but because the timing of decisions, mandates and programs were not concurrent 
among instruments, there was no coordinated EU crime strategy for BiH, let alone a strategy for 
the larger region.
57 Before the precise mandate for the follow-on mission was determine, the 
decision was taken to reduce the size of EUPM-II. Ideally, the mandate of the mission should 
determine the personnel staffing requirements. 
In EUPM-II there is a new, targeted focus on organized crime, a decision that came after a 
sustained internal debate in 2005 about the precise requirements for a follow-on mission to 
EUPM-I. Member states concurred that organized crime should be an integral focus of EUPM-
II, but engaged in a protracted discussion about whether it would require an executive mandate. 
This same discussion in 2005 mirrored the one in 2002, in which there was convergence among 
EU member state officials and SFOR that EUPM-I should have a targeted focus on organized 
crime and corruption but disagreements about the mandate requirements.
58  
In fact, national and EU officials seemed unprepared for the tensions that emerged among Pillar 
II missions (and individuals) last year. In 2005, there was more strain between EUPM and 
EUFOR, specifically over the issue of mission mandates and strategies to address organized 
crime, than between either EUFOR or EUPM with the EC Delegation. On the contrary, the 
cooperation between EUPM and the EC Delegation and CARDS program has worked quite 
well.
59  
The first Commander of EUFOR, General Leakey, was encouraged by High Representative 
Solana to emphasize EUFOR as a new and distinct mission from SFOR, even in so much as 
EUFOR was to continue SFOR’s key military tasks of deterrence (providing “reassurance” and 
security) and compliance work (inspecting defense industries, weapon collections and de-
mining). NATO and the EU had engaged in a complicated “delineation of tasks” between the 
residual NATO presence in BiH and EUFOR.
60 Hence, NATO and EUFOR both have 
responsibility for coordinating activities such as monitoring BiH compliance, conducting the 
fight against terrorism and finding and detaining war criminals. NATO maintained primary 
involvement in BiH defense reform while EUFOR initiated proactive operations to support the 
fight against organized crime, such as through border checkpoints to disrupt organized crime 
networks and assisting local law enforcement agencies.  
                                                 
57 This lack of coordination is endemic to a situation where there are multiple EU and international 
community instruments deployed and developed at different times in the decision-making chain. Beyond 
this traditional problem is the attendant proclivity of the EU to design programs in functionally discrete 
ways and to reinforce pillar divisions in program design, and ongoing member state divergences that 
complicates the process of arriving at a clear EU policy. 
58 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, SFOR, OHR and Member State Officials, 2002-2005.  
59 The effective cooperation between EUPM and the European Commission was confirmed during yearly 
interviews (2003-2006) with EUPM officials and the European Commission delegation in Sarajevo. 
60 EUFOR assumed its responsibilities under the framework of Berlin-Plus whereby the PSC exercises 
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Unlike with defense reform in which there was a clear mandate for NATO’s primary leadership 
in the process, both EUFOR and EUPM-I had mandates which permitted involvement by both 
missions in the fight against organized crime. Different members of the international 
community, in explaining the tension between EUFOR and EUPM in 2005, provided the 
following characterization of the problem. On the one hand some officials contended that 
organized crime is not normally fought in Western European countries by deploying soldiers at 
checkpoints or using the military for criminal disruption activities and that EUFOR was in 
search of a mission for itself and doing little to solve the problem. Conversely, other officials 
suggested that EUPM was “hiding behind its lack of an operational mandate” and not being 
proactive enough.  
The twin problems of program design and evaluation of program effectiveness is not simply an 
issue for EUPM-type missions. EU and national officials have questioned what EUFOR 
achieved in 2005, in regard to EUFOR’s role in organized crime disruption. The absence of a 
link between EUFOR’s disruption of criminal activities (such as closing down an illegal logging 
operation that would reopen elsewhere) and the prosecution of cases seriously limited the effect 
EUFOR could have on addressing systemic causes of organized crime.
61 Fighting organized 
crime takes lawyers, auditors, prosecutors, and not just the police, and, not typically, the 
military. However, with close to 7000 troops and an executive mandate that allowed it to 
provide operational support to BiH authorities and to gather intelligence, Commander Leakey 
saw an opportunity to enable EUFOR to fulfill one of the key supporting tasks outlined for 
Operation Althea, and at a time in which there was growing dissatisfaction among many EU 
member states about EUPM-I’s supposed lack of operational activism.
62  
Experience suggests that, earlier than in autumn 2005, the EU should have rapidly 
commissioned a comprehensive analysis about the extent to which organized crime is a problem 
in BiH, the implications of such, and the combination of EU and BiH tools best suited to 
address the problems.
63 The lack of coordination among EU instruments was certainly, in part, 
due to differences among HOM’s and their own respective interpretation of mission mandates, 
but it also reflects member state dissonance about EUPM-I, its mandate and the strategies best 
suited to address the problem of organized crime. Most problematic, however, is that the 
Brussels based decision-making process created a situation in which there were overlapping 
mandates between the two ESDP operations in BiH without an earlier effort to identify 
appropriate mechanisms for intra-pillar coordination.  
During 2006-2007, the EU has the opportunity to achieve a better equilibrium among its 
instruments in BiH and its experiences in BiH should prove to be a valuable template for EU 
operations in Kosovo. In September, 2005 EUFOR, EUPM and EUSR agreed on seven 
principles to enhance their cooperation and complementary assistance to the BiH Law 
Enforcement Agencies in tackling organized crime and corruption in BiH. This agreement was 
followed in May, 2006 with the adoption of a set of “Common Operational Guidelines for 
EUPM-EUFOR support to the fight against organized crime”.
64 Accordingly, both EUPM and 
EUFOR have adjusted roles.
65  
                                                 
61 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, EUFOR Officials, 2005-2006. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See Devine and Mathisen (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of corruption in BiH. 
64 Brussels, PSC Conclusions, 13 September 2005 and “Common Operational Guidelines for EUPM-
EUFOR support to the fight against organized crime”, Sarajevo, 11 May 2006.   
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EUPM-II is developing a more proactive role than in its first mission and is leading 
coordination of ESDP policing aspects, such as in assisting local authorities in their fight against 
organized crime and strengthening the control, inspection and accountability of BiH police. 
EUFOR is progressively reducing its role so that the BiH law enforcement agencies will assume 
initiative for operations, with advice provided by EUPM and EUSR. The intent is that EUFOR 
will provide support to local authorities, after a request has been made, and only after both 
EUFOR and EUPM endorse the support as essential and useful for increased BiH capacity 
building. As BiH authorities become more independent, the need for EUFOR support will 
reduce accordingly.
66  
The missions of EUFOR and EUPM-II are focused on increasing the “local ownership” of EU 
program objectives. For post-conflict countries attempting peaceful, democratic transformation 
of state institutions, the key to long-term success inevitably requires national ownership of the 
reform process and shared consensus between government and civil society. To achieve such 
objectives, ESDP would benefit from a stronger connection between its program goals and 
priorities with those of local authorities, both to avoid a mismatch and to increase the 
probability of success for ESDP programs. Co-location in the field between EUPM officials and 
BiH officers was a step in the right direction. However, EUPM-I also would have profited from 
bringing BiH officials into the unit responsible for program development (they did not do so 
until EUPM-II).  
As the BiH Director for European Integration sees it, one of the problems is that “BiH is still 
seen as more of a political-security problem than a country involved in economic transition to 
EU membership”.
67 In his view, the real threat to BiH is from economic underdevelopment, 
rather than ethnic nationalism. Citizens want and need to see how the EU is helping to improve 
the conditions of daily life, such as being able to purchase a daily newspaper, to travel to other 
European countries, or to see less crime.
68 The Director is concerned with corruption, a problem 
he believes is more significant a threat than organized crime since “there is not even a Bosnian 
mafia”. He does not deny that organized crime is a threat (such as in the sector of human 
trafficking that requires continued progress by BiH to control its borders), but the Director does 
question whether the issue has been inflated by the international community, especially given 
the scope of organized crime problems elsewhere in the region. The extent to which organized 
crime is a problem for BiH, the distinctions between organized, transnational crime and 
generalized corruption, and the strategies best suited to address both problems are questions of 
urgent relevance for EU and OHR officials and not just for BiH officials.
69 Necessarily, these 
are questions which confirm the importance of the EU continuing to highlight the intertwined 
relationship among organized crime, corruption and underdevelopment as part of a multifaceted 
strategy for post-conflict stabilization and development.  
                                                 
66 The EUSR/OHR has primary responsibility for facilitating the coordination of ESDP instruments in the 
sector of organized crime and corruption through the governing body of the Crime Strategy Working 
Group, which is chaired by the EUSR/OHR, and consists of the Head of EUPM, COM EUFOR and the 
EUSR. The second body of significance at the operational level is the EU-ESDP Targeting board, chaired 
by EUPM; officials from EUPM, EUFOR, EUSR, CAFAO, OHR and the Prosecutor’s Office participate 
in the board in order to provide support to BiH authorities in their efforts to fight organized crime, 
corruption and terrorism. Thirdly, the EUFOR Targeting Board is focused on determining the level and 
type of EUFOR support to be provided to local BiH police operations as well as for EUFOR led 
operations under its Dayton mandate.  
67 Personal interview, Sarajevo, Director of European Integration, July 2005 and June 2006.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Personal interviews, Sarajevo, EUPM, OHR, European Commission Delegation Officials, 2005 and 
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In the new EU Strategy for Organized Crime in BiH, there is more focus on expanding contact 
with BiH locals, through strengthened relationships with government officials and by holding 
town meetings and initiating public surveys. This is an encouraging development. Nonetheless, 
scant attention has been paid to the role that civil society might play in ESDP missions, 
however. In the new “division of labor” envisioned in the area of organized crime, it is only the 
EC Delegation that is explicitly tasked with civil society/NGO’s. This seems to be a missed 
opportunity for ESDP, at least as so far as missions need to better connect to locally defined 
needs and not just externally developed objectives.  
For example, effective strategies to combat human trafficking (an organized criminal activity in 
the Balkans) require a gender-sensitive approach, sustained national commitment, and a clear 
partnership between elite actors and civil society. Gender is a cross-cutting issue in conflict-
affected and transitional countries, especially in the context of security sector reform and efforts 
to tackle organized crime.
70 For EUPM-II and EUFOR to devise effective programs to address 
human trafficking, as well as other organized criminal activities, they will need to devise more 
systematic procedures for consulting with domestic political actors and civil society, including 
local women’s organizations. 
A triangulated strategy for organized crime is now emerging among EUSR/OHR, EUPM and 
EUFOR. EUFOR and EUPM will be mutually dependent in new ways – a new type of 
coordination that should be particularly instructive for Kosovo, where multiple EU instruments 
are likely to be in theatre. In effect, the adjusted roles for EUFOR and EUPM reflect an ability 
by the EU to engage in important self-correction. While some observers have argued that these 
adjustments should have occurred earlier, the natural point to do so was as part of the political 
negotiations for determining the revised mandate for EUPM-II and with the new HOM’s for 
both EUFOR and EUPM-II. The central lesson that has emerged from EU operations to address 
organized crime in 2005 is that ESDP missions which share thematic areas of operational 
responsibility (e.g. for organized crime) must have mandates and programs that reflect a distinct 
conceptual strategy for how each instrument is to be used in relationship to other EU missions, 
and, how ESDP programs can be better supported (and understood) by local actors and civil 
society, the individuals and communities who are responsible for the implementation and 
ownership of EU programs.  
3.3  From BiH to Kosovo 
The future status of Kosovo and EU relations with Serbia are of primary significance to the 
stabilization of BiH. The EU has placed a planning team in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) in order to 
begin preparation for a new ESDP mission in Kosovo. The early conclusion of an inter-pillar 
                                                 
70 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 2000, 1) provides a clear mandate for gender 
mainstreaming in SSR procedures by its reaffirmation of the “important role of women in the prevention 
and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security”. Prior to 
2005, the Council of the EU did not engage in any systematic effort to analyze the implications of 
UNSCR 1325 – passed back in 2000 – for ESDP operations. In December 2005, the Council of the EU, 
under the UK Presidency, approved a document on the “implementation of the UNSCR 1325 in the 
context of the ESDP” (Council 2005e). As follow-up, the EU Institute for Security Studies was asked to 
examine gender mainstreaming in ESDP operations using the case of EU missions in BiH. Batt and 
Valenius (2006, 7) found that “while top-level officers in both [EUPM and EUFOR] demonstrated a 
positive disposition towards women in the missions, one could not avoid the impression that they had 
very little knowledge of what gender mainstreaming actually is and what purposes it serves”. Although 
the EU and its member states formally have acknowledged their commitment to implementing UNSCR 
1325, there is a lack of clear tools and benchmarks to guide policy and programming initiatives and an 
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fact-finding mission for Kosovo, and the rapid deployment of EUPT, is indicating institutional 
learning on several accounts. First, EUPT is attempting to reduce the number of problems 
experienced during the EUPM takeover of IPTF in 2002 by placing EUPT personnel on the 
ground to do advance planning, in so far as that is possible given the complex political 
negotiations that are still underway for a final settlement for Kosovo. Second, EUPT includes 
individuals with experience from ESDP missions in BiH and Macedonia, as well as personnel 
with experience outside of the Balkans to provide fresh insights. Third, EUPT is comprised of 
comprehensive rule of law experts including police officers, judges and prosecutors, a lesson 
learned from ESDP in BiH. Fourth, the Council and Commission have produced joint papers in 
an early indication of inter-pillar cooperation. Fifth, there is already a clear acknowledgement 
about the importance for an ESDP mission to proactively cooperate with the European 
Commission, local officials, and other international organizations in order to increase policy 
coherence and reduce the number of problems emblematic of a post-conflict situation where 
numerous international stakeholders operate.  
While the deployment of EUPT suggests that the EU is thus applying valuable lessons from EU 
operations in BiH, there are unsolved challenges that will confront an ESDP mission in Kosovo. 
First, as has been the case for ESDP missions elsewhere, EUPT has struggled to fill its 
personnel vacancies in an expedient manner, particularly in the justice sector. The problems of 
personnel recruitment and training, already discussed in the context of ESDP in BiH, will need 
to be rapidly addressed by the member states. Second, program design, implementation and 
assessment issues will be a continued test for ESDP in Kosovo. In the medium-term, there will 
need to be ad hoc working groups that bring together personnel from the three pillars of the 
Union (Commission officials participated in the fact-finding mission for Kosovo but are not 
present in EUPT) for a sustained and institutionalized conversation about the assessment 
procedures, implementation methods and cooperation mechanisms for a broadly focused rule of 
law mission in Kosovo.  
For EUPM, the Union would have benefited from a more systematic consideration of how to 
best package, implement and market a strengthening mission. These issues will also confront an 
ESDP mission in Kosovo, but in the additionally complex environment of an ESDP mission 
likely to include an executive mandate. As the EU did in the revised mandate for EUPM-II, any 
future mission in Kosovo must include clearly delineated expectations, both for the end state to 
be achieved, as well as for determining measurable assessment mechanisms and benchmarking 
targets. Program design and implementation should occur with the early participation and 
feedback of host government officials and, ideally, with the involvement of civil society.  
Lastly, an ESDP mission in Kosovo will necessarily oblige the EU and NATO to initiate further 
dialogue, both at the political level in Brussels and in the field, beyond what has taken place so 
far. There cannot be a large civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo without formal communication 
and intelligence exchange procedures with NATO/KFOR. The most fractious issues are apt to 
involve some of the same methodological debates that confronted EUFOR and EUPM in BiH – 
the role of the military instrument when there is a police mission present, the overwhelming 
number of military forces vis-à-vis ESDP police officers, the likely continuation of KFOR’s 
provision for public order and security, and the division of responsibilities and methods of 
cooperation in the fight against organized crime. What will complicate the decision-making 
process for Kosovo is that it will engage both the EU and NATO, and it will not be limited to an 
internal EU debate between EUPM and EUFOR. 
A likely byproduct of an ESDP mission in Kosovo will be distinctively new mechanisms for 
coordination in the field, between field personnel and Brussels, between the EU and NATO, 
and, perhaps, even between the US and EU. At the 2006 US-EU summit in Vienna, the US and 
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in the area of crisis management, including more contact between EU and US officials in 
Brussels and in conflict zones such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
71 
Although NATO remains the preferred venue for US security cooperation with its European 
allies, the intrinsic demands of international crisis management, and the steady augmentation of 
EU crisis response capabilities, have compelled greater US attention to its bilateral security 
relationship with the EU. An ESDP mission in Kosovo is likely to increase such cooperation, 
especially if the US would participate in the mission as a contributing state, something the US 
has yet to do in any previous ESDP mission. Such a decision would likely have the spillover 
consequence of facilitating improved functional coordination in crisis management between the 
EU and NATO, but also between the US and EU.  
4.  Conclusion: The Future of European Union Crisis Response  
The lessons identified about the successes and failures of the post-conflict transformation of 
BiH will be relevant for the future success of EU operations such as for an EU mission in 
Kosovo, but also in more distant places like Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sudan and DRC.  
BiH Defense Minister Radovanovic believes that: “From Bosnia and Herzegovina, we learn 
how to address issues of cultural identity, political participation, and democratic representation 
and how to properly discuss conflict, history, and identity. Bosnia and Herzegovina can be 
compared with Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Middle East. The central problem for all of 
these areas is how to develop mechanisms and structures to address conflict and identity, to 
support a culture of democratic dialogue, and to foster the rule of law”.
72 
There may well be in the future some purely civilian ESDP operations, and some purely military 
ones. But the example of BiH demonstrates the urgent need for the EU to institute 
comprehensive planning for its missions, such as in security sector reform and rule of law, and 
within the decision-making structures of external relations. In the case of BiH, traditional 
impediments to civil-military cooperation do not exist because the state is in a post-conflict 
period where its state-level institutions are weak. Thus, it is not difficult to reshape or encourage 
new patterns of cooperation. The Minister of Defense for BiH confirmed this point and 
explained that his government has a long term goal to create an integrated, multifaceted security 
culture centered on human security and the challenges of modern peacekeeping.
73 Already, the 
BiH government is attempting to create a new “defense-security” nexus for lower-level officials 
to encourage civil-military cooperation and to promote a new view of security that moves 
beyond territorial defense. In the view of the Minister, another important catalyst for creating 
this new security culture will be its extension to the regional level of the Balkans.
74 This type of 
creative thinking by BiH government officials needs to be encouraged by the EU as part of a 
coherent security sector reform process for BiH, a process that goes well beyond the sectoral 
                                                 
71 2006 EU-U.S Summit Progress Report on Political and Security Issues, June 21, 2006.  
72 Personal interview, Sarajevo, Minister of Defense for BiH, July 2005.  
73 Personal interview, Sarajevo, Minister of Defense for BiH, July 2005 and June 2006.  
74 In 2012, BiH, in cooperation with the international community, will assume coordination of the Peace 
Support Operations Training Center (currently training military officials from Balkan countries at 
EUFOR’s Camp Butmir, outside Sarajevo). The strategy of the MOD is to open up the training center for 
civil servants and other personnel involved in security, in order to bridge the traditional civil-military 
divide. Minister Radovanovic would like to see the training center develop into a college targeted to mid-
level defense, civil servants and police officers. A second function of the training center/college would be 
to create a national security and defense program for senior military personnel and civil servants to teach 
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reforms of defense or police services and which is viewed as an indispensable component of 
preparing BiH to become a member of both NATO and the EU.  
Minister Radovanovic perspicaciously captured the challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
for the EU and its member states, when he argued that his country, as well as other EU and 
Western states, “needs to better study the problems of modern peacekeeping to have a modern 
security community that is easily able to fulfill complex tasks”.
75 The type of complementary or 
integrated civil-military missions envisioned by the EU requires a commensurate level of 
complex mission design, implementation and evaluation – a level of integration and 
multidimensionality that the current structures do not, as yet, completely support or facilitate.  
A case in point would be the Civil-Military Cell that is under the direction of the EU Military 
Staff (EUMS). It was born, as most new structures are, from a unique set of political 
circumstances and as a compromise between the French who wanted an Operations Center for 
ESDP military operations and the British who advocated integrated civil-military planning. The 
cell as currently configured and as located in the EUMS, brings more of a civil component to 
military missions. It is not designed to provide truly comprehensive, holistic integration of crisis 
response along the continuum of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
reconstruction. The Civil-Military Cell is not being fully utilized operationally and currently is 
caught in the midst of intra-pillar conflict within the ESDP structures.
76 Furthermore, within the 
Council Secretariat, there is an unclear delineation between policy and operational planning, 
between DG VIII and IX, between DG IX and the Civil-Military Cell, with the end product 
being intra-institutional tension and a lack of decision-making clarity.
77  
In sum, there needs to be continued restructuring of the Brussels decision-making structures as 
well as continued attention to external relations field management and operations, including, of 
course, the entire program cycle for ESDP. The first and somewhat obvious steps toward a 
solution to improve EU crisis response mechanisms are to augment the capacities and personnel 
of DG IX, especially in light of the upcoming ESDP operation in Kosovo, and over the medium 
and long-term, to reorganize the Council Secretariat bodies responsible for ESDP, as well as the 
pillar structure for external relations. Ultimately, increased financial expenditures will be 
necessary if the EU is to have the requisite resources to achieve its ambitious objectives for 
global conflict prevention and crisis response. A second step is to bring independent civilian 
analysts (both in Brussels and in field operations) into program development and assessment 
alongside and in cooperation with EU officials, to provide a means for ESDP personnel 
recruitment other than through national secondment. A third initiative to improve the quality of 
missions and the decision-making procedures that support them is to appoint “in house” 
research scholars for policy oriented research in the area of crisis management and post-conflict 
stabilization. A more systematic research effort by the EU is related to a fourth step to enhance 
on-the-ground effectiveness of ESDP missions: an increase in the quality of induction training 
for personnel serving the missions. The critical need for mission training holds true even for the 
highest levels of ESDP officials, including Heads of Mission (HOM), whose EU expertise and 
understanding of ESDP can vary widely. A fifth measure is for the EU to increase attention on 
the contribution of civil society, including the acceleration of the mainstreaming of gender and 
human rights perspectives within ESDP missions, in order to avoid a mismatch between EU 
program goals and priorities and those of local communities.  
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76 Personal interviews, Brussels, Council Secretariat and Member State officials, June 2006. 
77 This point was referenced by many officials, including those from DGE, the EUMS, and the European 
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At present, the most intriguing question concerns the changes to the Council Secretariat 
proposed by High Representative Solana at the June European Council Session (2006c) in order 
to strengthen the capacity, coherence, and clarity of crisis management decision-making 
structures, without actually modifying the terms of reference or structures for the Council 
Secretariat.
78 Referred to as “the Hampton Court follow-up”, High Representative Solana has 
indicated that he will establish a new Crisis Management Board (CMB) to meet prior to an 
operational decision, as well as at regular intervals to evaluate ongoing ESDP operations and 
facilitate an evaluation of lessons learned. The Council Secretariat would be further restructured 
into four integrated groups comprised of: Intelligence/Situation and Risk Assessment (Group 
A); Policy (Group B); Planning (Group C); and Operational Execution/Strengthening 
Implementation Capacity (Group D with the double-hatting of the Director of Civilian Crisis 
Management (DG IX) as a Civilian Operation Commander, ostensibly to improve the chain of 
command for civilian ESDP operations.
79  
The current “Hampton Court” proposal by High Representative Solana has generated 
controversy among member states and Council Secretariat personnel about the desirability of 
the proposed changes. This is a conversation that should occur among a wide section of relevant 
ESDP actors in order to increase ownership for future changes among affected personnel. 
Invariably, the proposed changes by High Representative Solana are likely to be short-term 
solutions to more long-term problems of structural coherence and capacity, which inevitably 
will require a change in the terms of reference, an increase in Council Secretariat staff, and an 
inevitable blurring of pillar distinctions. 
Moreover, it is a convenient fiction that no extra resources will be required to improve the 
present functioning of ESDP and by extension, the Council Secretariat. Although the CFSP 
budget increased from 62.6 million euros in 2005 to 102.6 million euros in 2006, it is still a very 
small sum, given the rapid increase in civilian crisis management operations (Council 2006e). 
While the Civil-Military Cell could be more fully utilized, and other structural responsibilities in 
the Secretariat better delineated, the simple reality is that a continued burgeoning of ESDP 
operations will require an increase in both personnel and financial expenditures, as well as an 
unremitting reflection among member states about the nature and purpose of ESDP as an 
instrument of EU external relations.  
Do member states want to provide civilian operations with a permanent pool of legal and 
political advisers, for example? Will they continue to rely on national secondment practices for 
mission staffing or will they permit the EU to use international civilian secondments, like the 
UN? Will member states increase coordination with the 3
rd pillar and include representatives 
from EUROPOL and EUROJUST in ESDP missions? What about the functional field 
relationship among EUSR’s, Commission delegations and ESDP missions, as well as the 
relationship between EU operations with domestic political leaders and civil society actors? 
Will the EU be able to capitalize on its strengths to produce deepened stakeholder cooperation 
at all levels of decision-making?  
From a study of ESDP in BiH, it becomes evident that the exacting process of delineating 
responsibilities for the full range of instruments available to the EU and its member states has 
produced greater self-clarity regarding the way forward for ESDP, both for civilian and military 
tasks, as well as for more integrated crisis response that may require deployment of multiple 
instruments in rapid and non-linear succession. In BiH, as well as in crisis areas such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, there is a growing realization that effective post-conflict stabilization requires a 
systematic and careful integration of a full-spectrum of security responsibilities and capabilities. 
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The EU has understood the complexity of post-conflict stabilization challenges but until its 
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has not actually had the experience to develop the 
policies, institutions and mechanisms to cope most effectively with the obstacles presented by 
complex field operations. ESDP will benefit from the deepening competence and experience of 
its officials as they further refine the methodology of implementation for ESDP and extend their 
experience in security sector reform, civil-military cooperation and comprehensive crisis 
response. 
Most certainly, the challenges for EU field operations – complexity, multidimensionality, and 
policy integration – are challenges also for the United States, the UN and other global actors. 
The EU, through its unique repertoire of civilian and military instruments, is one of the most 
uniquely suited powers to shape and drive international improvements in integrated crisis 
response. Enlarging and improving the pool of appropriate personnel available for field 
operations, expanding common training and creating new and improved decision-making 
structures and procedures, as well as techniques of coordination informed by concrete field 
experience and technical and political expertise, are three major means by which the EU can 
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